Surveying an urban 'umma islamiyya' in Germany: numbers and issues relating to the religious self-identification

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ABSTRACT
This article looks at self-identified Muslims in Germany, taking the city of Frankfurt am Main as an example. The article makes extensive use of recent qualitative and quantitative research data on Islam in Germany. It aims to help those religious studies scholars who do not have command of the German language or lack access to the referred research to get a quick introduction into the topic. A closer look at the existing data suggests that the imagined 'umma islamiyya', posited both through the scholarly research and internal Islamic view as 'the Muslim community' is a fictitious entity. It is composed of heterogeneous individuals who are viewed as members of abstract sets according to their origins, ethnicity, mother language, denomination, religiosity, migrant history, gender, age, education, social openness and other criteria. Slightly more than a half of the estimated 80,000 Muslims in Frankfurt have a migrant background with origins in Turkey. Significant numbers of Muslims come from Morocco, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. Three out of four Muslims in Frankfurt are Sunnis. Other big denominations are Shiites, Alevi and Ahmadis. Research shows that the majority of individuals who self-identify as Muslims are not involved in the existing Muslim associations and do not feel represented by them. Brief observations are made on the growing Salafi identity among younger Muslims. The number of individuals belonging mostly to the second and third generations of Muslim migrants, whose imagined Salafi Muslim identity dominates over their cultural, ethnic and class divisions, while still small, is growing.
Introduction

Numbers and statistics are no doubt important data for the study of religions. The observation made once by Jonathan Z. Smith, ‘...there is no data for religion. Religion is solely the creation of the scholar's study. It is created for the scholar's analytic purposes by his imaginative acts of comparison and generalization’ (Smith 1982, p. xi), should keep us alert to the fact that numbers and statistics are also product of both complex social identity construction and power negotiation processes and should not be taken for granted at face value. Any quantitative research is based on qualitative assumptions pertaining to the criteria made relevant for drawing the boundaries for constructing identities defined as religious (Tweed 2006, pp. 29-53). Those should be made explicit and critically reflected in terms of the dialectics of freedom and necessity of religious self-determination of free individuals (Weber 2013, p. 52) to prevent ill grounded speculations on politically sensitive issues pertaining to real or imaginary identity boundaries.

One prominent recent example of such speculation is Thilo Sarrazin's bestseller Deutschland schafft sich ab, which can be roughly translated as 'Germany is abolishing itself'. The former chairman of the German Bundesbank appeals to statistics and presents a gloomy picture of impending consequences for the German future resulting from a combination of decline in the birth-rate, growing lower classes and significant immigration from the Muslim countries (Sarrazin 2010). The last chapter of the book Ein Traum und ein Alptraum – Deutschland in 100 Jahren, which can be translated as 'Dream and nightmare - Germany in 100 years', is the author's vision of a future Germany. Sarrazin vividly pictures a future mayor of the city of Weimar as a very devout person with Arabic origins who needs to make a decision about the restoration of the Herzogin Anna Amalia Library. The son of Allah announces with deep sorrow that the city funds are so scarce that he would rather allocate them for a courtyard for the new mosque or renovation of the Qur'anic school (Sarrazin 2010, p. 391-408).

The controversial book sparked nationwide public debates (Deutschlandstiftung Integration 2010). Scholars of religion generally tend to refrain from public debates, although the responsibility to take part in public discourse on religion is getting increasingly recognized among scholars of religion (Bechmann 2012). The excellent work of Naika Foroutan and her colleagues of the Humboldt University of Berlin convincingly countered conjectures made by Sarazzin, having disproved his claims, also using numbers (Foroutan 2010).

It is an important task of scholars of religion to demonstrate the falsity of the picture of homogenous Islam in Europe and to show that 'Muslims' is a collective term labelling people with diverse identities and different ethnic and denominational backgrounds. Regarding Germany, Sonja Haug, Stephanie Müssig and Anja Stichs published a very important work giving a comprehensive study on Muslim life in Germany conducted on behalf of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees and the German Conference on Islam (Haug et al. 2009). The study concludes with a clear message: 'The
diversity of Muslim life in the Federal Republic of Germany should be adequately reflected in the debates about integration' (Haug 2009, p. 334).

Actually, in many senses there is no ‘Muslim life’, but rather many different kinds of self-identified ‘Muslim’ individuals who have a whole bunch of other multiple identities: family, clan, region, ethnicity, politics, denomination, gender, language, class, income, profession, hobby, etc. As Graham E. Fuller, a former Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA, points out in his influential book A World without Islam, different identities ‘operate during different phases of our daily life; family and clan are prominent during ritual ceremonies, celebrations, and support networks; political identities during elections; national identity during military service; religious identity during times of solemn passage-of-life ceremonies; professional identity during times of professional work and associations; gender identity in the presence of the opposite sex, and for female when facing discrimination. Class solidarities can briefly overcome even ethnicity in periods of economic hardship and collective bargaining. Different circumstances evoke differing identity responses’ (Fuller 2012, p. 9). However, people themselves construct their experience, feel solidarity, draw imaginary boundaries, form associations, building overarching group identities ’deemed religious’ (Taves 2009). These constructs get currency and it is still often assumed that religious collectives are authentic religious subjects. These collectives are assumed to be invested with authority to speak and act for individuals, to represent their religion which does not square well with religious self-identification of modern individuals (Weber 2013, p. 47). We can see the similar situation with Islam in Europe. As Bassam Tibi points out, the Islamic civilization has the community and not the individual as its starting frame of reference, since each Muslim has obligations, ‘faraid’, towards Allah and ‘umma’ (Tibi 2009, p. 121). So scholars following the self-proclaimed religious authorities, judging religious traditions by their own lights so to speak, come to speak of ‘the Muslim community’, the imaginary ‘umma islamiyya’.

The Arabic concept of 'umma islamiyya' denotes the global Islamic community of all Muslims who are thought to belong together through their affiliation with Islam. Muslims with different regional and ethnic origins and cultural backgrounds are thought to form this imagined community. Natalia Diefenbach has introduced this emic concept of ‘umma islamiyya’ into the scholarly use as the operational umbrella term denoting this explicitly imaginary unity of people who define themselves as Muslims (Diefenbach-Popov 2007, p. 11). The term is applied collectively to self-identified Muslims with diverse ethnic and denominational backgrounds. In this scholarly use one can speak e.g. of the global ‘umma islamiyya’, European ‘umma islamiyya’, or German ‘umma islamiyya’. Also all inhabitants of a given European city identifying themselves as Muslims, albeit with different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, would form an imaginary urban ‘umma islamiyya’. This use is comparable with the customary one in census and surveys which often generalise and speak of Muslims or the Muslim community. It is important to keep in mind, that though the urban ‘umma islamiyya’ is a fictitious entity, this term may help create the identity, relating to all Muslims and overshadowing
their denominational, ethnic, cultural and migration differences, thus creating the imaginary boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims. The motivational power of social construction should not be underestimated. Imagined identities can create real boundaries and become powerful social forces, specifically at times of hardship and perceived aggression (Fuller 2012, p. 295 f). The still tiny number of the self-proclaimed Salafi Muslims in Germany has however experienced rapid growth among younger Muslims in recent years which is sometimes attributed to perceived aggression and the feeling of exclusion (Said and Fouad 2014, p. 33 f).

I will now try to give a sketch of the urban 'umma islamiyya' in Frankfurt am Main, indicating some important differences among self-identified Muslims and showing the diversity and high complexity of this imaginary 'umma'. I will use the official statistics of the city of Frankfurt am Main (Statistisches Jahrbuch 2013) and the above mentioned excellent statistical study on Muslim life in Germany (Haug et al., 2009) as my primary sources for numbers, extrapolating and updating the data where necessary. Another important source for this article is the pioneering qualitative descriptive study on Muslim religious cultures in Frankfurt done by Natalia Diefenbach (Diefenbach-Popov 2007), who observed different Muslim communities in Frankfurt over two years in milieu explorations, face-to-face interviewing, small talks, friendly talks, qualitative biography studies and participant observation (Diefenbach-Popov 2007, p. 12). It gives a lot of useful insider information on religious life of Muslims in Frankfurt and deserves special attention here since it is available only in German. As Diefenbach points out, it took her lots of time and effort to build up relationships of trust, essential for acquiring knowledge on how people feel, think and act, while formalized surveying brought very modest results (Diefenbach-Popov 2007, p. 13). Finally, I will make some observations on the growing number of younger individuals who identify themselves as Salafi Muslims using other recent German-language sources (Baehr 2012; Stoldt 2013; Said and Fouad 2014). I conclude that quantitative and qualitative research both contributes to our understanding of the diversity of Islam in Frankfurt and Germany and substantially supports the suggested interpretation of the 'umma islamiyya' as a fictitious entity.

**Issues in self-Identification and numbers**

The above mentioned sophisticated study on Muslim life in Germany was commissioned by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees and carried out by Sonja Haug, Stephanie Müssig and Anja Stichs. The study must be acknowledged for its depth and differentiation. It is extensive in scope and gives important statistical information on various aspects of Muslim life in Germany. In particular, it shows in numbers that the German 'umma islamiyya' is highly heterogeneous in terms of regional origin, denomination, migration biography, gender, generation, education, occupational standing, sources of household income, German language proficiency, residential environment, religiosity, sentiment towards representation by Muslim association, contacts with ethnic Germans, interreligious openness, attachment to Germany and the country of origin, etc. The two last chapters of the study are particularly important: chapter 6 'Concise profiles of migrant groups' and chapter 7
'Summary and conclusion' (Haug et al. 2009, pp. 293-309, 310-334). The scholars are aware of dangers of oversimplifications and sweeping generalisations and advise cautious use of the data. The pioneering qualitative micro milieu research done by Natalia Diefenbach (Diefenbach-Popov 2007) squares well with the work of Haug, Müssig and Stichs and gains quantitative substantiality. I can obviously mention only a fraction of the results, which nevertheless will show the impressive scale of differentiation and help to reveal real differences of origins, denomination, community involvement and religiosity. These differences, taken together, add up to the conclusion that the ‘umma islamiyya’ is an imaginary set constructed by both scholarly research and internal religious propaganda.

**Different identities of origin**

The number of Muslims living in Germany is estimated at between 3.8 and 4.3 million people or some 4.6 to 5.2 per cent of Germany’s total population of more than 80 million. Most Muslims (98 per cent) live in West Germany and Berlin. One in three Muslims in Germany lives in the Federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia. Some 45 per cent of all Muslims living in Germany are German nationals, while foreign nationals account for 55 per cent of all Muslims living in Germany coming from nearly 50 predominantly Muslim countries, e.g. Turkey, countries of former Yugoslavia, Morocco, Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan (Haug et al. 2009, p. 75 f).

The largest group is those citizens of Turkish descent. About 2.6 million of Muslims (some 63 per cent) have Turkish roots. An estimated 0.6 million (some 14 per cent) have their roots in the Southeast Europe: Bosnia, Bulgaria and Albania. Less than 5 per cent of Muslims have their origins in South and Southeast Asia (predominantly Afghanistan and Pakistan), less than 7 per cent in North Africa (predominantly Morocco), 8 per cent in the Middle East (notably from Iraq, Lebanon and Syria), less than 2 per cent in Iran, 1.4 per cent in the rest of Africa, less than 0.5 per cent of Muslims in Germany come from Central Asia/CIS (Haug et al. 2009, p. 91).

Migration from a Muslim country does not imply that the person identifies herself as a Muslim. One important finding of the study is the proportion of self-identified Muslims to the total number of persons with a migrant background, by their origins. The highest proportion is found for persons with a migrant background from Turkey: 81 per cent of individuals say they are Muslims. Also, 75 per cent of persons with a migrant origin in North Africa, 59 per cent of persons with origins in the Middle East and 57 per cent for persons with a migrant background from South and Southeast Asia identify themselves as Muslims. Only 49 per cent of persons with origins in Iran identify themselves as Muslims. From Southeast Europe 37 per cent, from other parts of Africa 22 per cent, from Central Asia and the CIS countries about 1 per cent (Haug et al. 2009, p. 312).

People who do not associate themselves with any religion account for a sizeable proportion of certain migrant groups. This applies particularly to Iran
(38 per cent), Central Asia/CIS (38 per cent), Southeast Europe (28 per cent), South/Southeast Asia (20 per cent), the Middle East (20 per cent), North Africa (22 per cent), other parts of Africa (17 per cent) and Turkey (15 per cent). Of all self reportedly non-religious immigrants, the migrants from Central Asia/CIS account for 44 per cent, Southeast Europeans 18 per cent, Turkish migrants 19 per cent, and Iranians 6 per cent (Haug et al. 2009, p. 308).

Although the relevant statistics for Frankfurt am Main is not available, the following estimates could be quite accurate. Frankfurt am Main has now possibly some 700,000 inhabitants (678,691 in 2012, Statistisches Jahrbuch 2013, p. 10), being the fifth largest city in Germany after Berlin, Hamburg, Munich and Cologne. The city is Germany's and Europe's important financial centre. It is home to the European Central Bank and many international and local financial institutions. Frankfurt has the country's biggest airport and is thus a very important gateway to Germany and Europe. It has a considerably bigger portion of the immigrant population than the rest of Germany. There were 501,756 German nationals living in Frankfurt am Main in 2012 which accounted for slightly less than three quarters of the city population. To be precise, 176,935 foreign nationals made up 26.1 per cent of the city population in 2012 (Statistisches Jahrbuch 2013, p. 15). It is worth noting that 144,706 people or 21.3 per cent of all Frankfurters were German nationals with a migrant background (Statistisches Jahrbuch 2013, p. 15). For example Germans who were born in a foreign country are regarded as German nationals with a migrant background. Also German children, who have at least one parent with a migrant background, are regarded by statistics as Germans with a family migration background (Statistisches Jahrbuch 2013, p. 7). The statistics shows that more than two thirds of all new-borns who have a foreign mother get German citizenship (Statistisches Jahrbuch 2013, p. 43). Thus, foreign nationals and German nationals with a migrant background account for some 47 per cent of the city population. Foreign nationals include 69,677 EU passport holders or 10.3 per cent of the population (Statistisches Jahrbuch 2013, p. 10). The most numerous groups of foreigners from countries with considerable Muslim communities come from the following regions:

- **Turkey:** 28,090 people, which is 15.9 per cent of all foreigners. Assuming 81 per cent of them are Muslims, we arrive at some 22,753 Turkish Muslims who are not German nationals living in Frankfurt;

- **Southeast Europe (Albania: 233, Bosnia and Herzegovina: 4,912, Croatia: 11,596, Macedonia: 1,259, Slovenia: 601, Serbia: 8,982, Kosovo: 696, Montenegro: 453):** 28,732 persons or 16.2 per cent of all foreigners. Assuming 37 per cent of all foreign nationals from Southeast Europe are Muslims (Haug 2009, p. 312), we could arrive at 10,631 Muslims living in Frankfurt, who are foreign nationals of the a.m. countries in Southeast Europe. However, this number is at odds with the findings of Natalia Diefenbach, who takes into consideration only people from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, taking them to build the third largest Muslim community of Balkan compatriots.
According to Diefenbach, the second largest group of Muslims in Frankfurt are Arabs (Diefenbach-Popov 2007, p. 20 f). Though it is difficult to decide on this issue, Diefenbach's estimates seem to be confirmed by the number of Muslim associations in Frankfurt which use Turkish, Arabic and Bosnian languages: 19 associations list Turkish as their language, 13 list Arabic, 7 Urdu, and only two Bosnian (one of them alongside Bosnian also lists Albanian, Croatian and Serbian);

Morocco: 5,711 persons or 3.2 per cent of all foreigners, of whom possibly some 4,443 are Muslims or 77.8 per cent of them (ratio for Moroccans in Germany taken from Haug et al. 2009, p. 83);

Arab countries other than Morocco (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia): 1,936 persons (1.1 per cent of all foreigners), of whom some 58 to 75 per cent are Muslims (Haug et al. 2009, p. 82 f);

India: 3,342 persons or 1.9 per cent, of whom Muslims are only a fraction (7.3 per cent - Haug et al. 2009, p. 82);

Pakistan: 1,497 persons (estimated 1,292 Muslims) and Bangladesh: 577 (some 390 Muslims) make up together 1.2 per cent of all foreign nationals living in Frankfurt;

Iran: 1,881 persons (est. 916 Muslims, or 48.7 per cent of all Iranian nationals living in Frankfurt) account for 1.1 per cent of all foreigners;

Afghanistan: 2,362 people or 1.3 per cent of all foreigners (estimated 1,639 Muslims or 69.4 per cent);

Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan and Uzbekistan: 710 people or 0.4 per cent; Indonesia and Malaysia: 500 or 0.3 per cent of all foreign nationals living in the city (Statistisches Jahrbuch 2013, p. 26).

Foreign nationals with the above mentioned origins totalled 52,000 in 2012.

To arrive at the approximate number in the city 'umma islamiyya', one has to take into account the inhabitants of Frankfurt who are German nationals with a migrant background (144,706 persons) extrapolating the above percentage for each region of origin. The number for each region should further be discounted respectively using the ratios of self-identification as Muslims. For example, it could be assumed that there are some 41,400 Muslims with Turkish origins: 28,090*0.81 + 144,706*0.159*0.81 = 41,389. Thus, the Frankfurt 'umma islamiyya' is composed of many ethnic diasporas, quite analogous to the global Islamic community, the 'umma', which consists of different ethnic groups having common ground in the faith of Islam. The urban 'umma' of Frankfurt can be said to represent Germany's 'umma' on a small
scale. However, both the country's and the city's 'umma' do not reflect the composition of the global 'umma'. Muslims from Indonesia, the country with the world's biggest Muslim population, are a tiny fraction of both the country's and the city 'umma'. The biggest fraction hold migrants from Turkey. The Frankfurt 'umma' has a smaller share of Muslims with origins in Turkey, probably half of the total number of all Muslims in Frankfurt. The Muslims with origins in Morocco build a second largest fraction of the city 'umma' and a clear majority within the multinational Arab diaspora in Frankfurt, which does not reflect the demographic situation in the Arab world (Diefenbach-Popov 2007, p. 17). Despite that, migrants from the Balkans outnumber those from Morocco, their share in the urban 'umma' is more modest, because of significant percentage of those, who do not identify themselves with any religion, e.g. more than 50 per cent of migrants with Albanian origins claim to have no religious affiliation whatsoever (Haug et al. 2009, p. 80f). Thus Muslims with a Turkish background build a clear majority. Other Muslims in Frankfurt are Bosnians, Pakistanis, Bengalis, Iranians, Arabs from different countries, Afghans, black Africans, ethnic Germans, Indonesians and Malay. Each ethnic group has its own cultural traditions (food habits, customs) brought from their respective regions of origin. The identity of origin generally tends to be as significant as the identity of denomination: the Frankfurt 'umma' is divided in ethnic communities within given denominations (for further details on ethnic differences see Diefenbach-Popov 2007, pp. 19-28).

**Different identities of denomination**

Scholars of religion are responsible for contributing to the general public awareness of the existence of a great number of attitudes within the varieties of Islam, to the extent that some varieties, for example, Salafi, deny the right of other varieties, like, for example Alevites or Ahmadis, to be part of the imaginary world community of Muslims - 'umma islammiya'.

The imaginary 'umma islammiyya' in Germany breaks down as follows: Sunnis 74 per cent, Alevis 13 per cent, Shiites 7 per cent, Ahmadis 2 per cent, Ibadis 0.3 per cent, Sufis/Mystics 0.1 per cent. The Sunnis make up the largest denominational group among Muslims from almost all regions of origin. Iran is an exception, since 95 per cent of Muslims coming from Iran are Shiites. Alevis come almost exclusively from Turkey (Haug et al. 2009, p. 313). Ahmadis account for 28 per cent of the Muslims from South and Southeast Asia (Haug et al. 2009, p. 93). There are no reliable statistics for Frankfurt. The city 'umma' is estimated to conform to the above composition (Diefenbach-Popov 2007, pp. 33-39).

Recent developments in Iraq and Syria, where radical Islamists are trying to establish the Islamic State, has drawn public attention to the Salafi movement in Germany. In August 2014 a documentary was shown on German TV telling the story of 16 year old Enis Ü. from Frankfurt. Enis was born in Germany in a family with a migrant background from Turkey, took interest in the Salafi movement, left for Syria to fight for the Islamic State and was killed there in 2013 (Hanfeld 2014).
There is no number for radical Salafis in Frankfurt. Salafi movement is highly heterogeneous (Baehr 2012; Nedza 2014). Salafis have, however, the fastest growth rate among Muslims. In North Rhine-Westphalia, the federal state where a third of all Muslims in Germany lives, there were estimated 500 radical Salafis in 2011, 1000 in 2012 and some 1500 in 2013 (Stoldt 2013). Many of those who join the Salafi movement are younger German nationals belonging to the second and third generation of Muslim migrants who are attracted by the Salafi propaganda on the Internet (Baehr 2012).

Natalia Diefenbach notices a tendency among self-identified Muslim persons of the second and third generations of migrants to position their German Muslim identity over other identities (Diefenbach-Popov 2007, p. 99). She reports some reluctance and reservation of younger Muslims regarding their participation in the research. Her research objectives were sometimes met with articulated suspicion; she could be a BND-agent (Diefenbach-Popov 2007, p. 12).

Some young Muslims belonging to the second and third generations of migrants, and also ethnic Germans who converted to Islam, turn to the Salafi movement in search for their religious identity. Within less than ten years the German Salafi movement grew out of a small network of preachers with a migrant background from Arabic countries into a new movement of the young Muslims who crave for the "true Islam" (Wiedl 2014, p. 438).

Another important point is the victim complex noticeable in confidential talks with some Muslims, who feel themselves victims of discrimination and anti-Islamic propaganda in the media. As Graham Fuller points out, 'the excessive prominence of the Muslim identity over other elements of identity primarily emerges in times of hardship' (Fuller 2012, p. 295).

Salafi preachers try to use the perceived discrimination against Muslims to win the hearts of the young with the revolutionary discourse of justice and the "true Islam" (Said and Fouad 2014, pp 33-37). It remains to be seen if this will be one important source for the unwelcome development of the dangers of political Islam (Tibi 2009) and if it could account for the rapid growth of the still tiny radical Salafi community which effectively uses the Internet for its recruitment activity (Baehr 2012).

Further research is needed to address the issue of what exactly motivates which individuals to find in Salafi Islam a common identity notwithstanding the differences in their ethnic, linguistic, cultural backgrounds or class standing. Paradoxically, the Salafi movement has a polarising effect not only on the perception of the Islam by non-Muslims, but also on the imagined 'umma islamiyya' itself. Judging by the leading lights of the Salafis most individuals who regard themselves as Muslim should be treated as non-believers or 'kuffar'; even radical like-minded Islamists like Muslim Brothers accuse the Salafis of dividing the 'umma' (Said and Fouad 2014, p. 42).
Difference of community involvement

Some 25-30 years ago two nationwide overarching bodies of Muslims were founded: the Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (IR, Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany) in 1986 and the Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (ZMD, Central Council of Muslims in Germany), established in 1991 under the name of the islamischer Arbeitskreis, from 1994 on called ZMD. Both bodies, while representing many of the Muslim umbrella organizations and larger Muslim communities in Germany, see themselves as competitors. They have a common coordination council, but cooperate only to a limited extent (Kaweh, p. 1). Other large umbrella organizations of Muslim communities are Diyanet (DiTiB, Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs), Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren (VIKZ, Association of Islamic Culture Centres), Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland (AABF, Alevi Community in Germany) and Koordinationsrat der Muslime (KRM, Coordination Council of Muslims). They consist of small local communities (Haug et al. 2009, p. 165).

Natalia Diefenbach observes, that local Muslim communities in Frankfurt are typically based on regional or ethnic origins, have a legal form of association (German: Verein) and focus their activities on four areas: religious, ethnic-cultural, societal-political and supplemental care of its members (Diefenbach-Popov 2007, p. 44 f).

It is no wonder that most local associations are run by compatriots from the same milieu: they are families and friends with close ties. Muslim Associations of people with the same ethnic origins can also reflect the political circumstances of migration. For example, despite a relatively small number of Muslims from Afghanistan, they have four different communities, reflecting not only denominational difference (one Shiite and three Sunni associations), but also the difference in migration circumstance: radical religious Afghans who fled from the Soviet occupation differ from those Afghans who fled from the Taliban regime. Distinctions in political circumstances of immigration can be found among Muslims from all regions.

The homepage of the city of Frankfurt lists 44 communities, each specifying denomination and languages spoken in the community. One community can use one, two, three, four or even five languages. Shiites and Sunnis show clear division on ethnic, linguistic and political grounds. Over 24 out of 44 associations indicate exclusively their regional languages (Turkish, Arabic, Pashto and Dari, Urdu, Albanian and Bosnian), 16 communities combine their regional languages (Turkish, Arabic, Pashto and Dari, Urdu, Bosnian, Indonesian, Bengali, Farsi) with German and in the case of the Ahmadis also with English. The African Muslim Association indicates German, English and French as their languages (http://www.frankfurt.de/sixcms/detail.php?id=3747&_ffmpar[_id_inhalt]=1153968, accessed 20 June 2014).

The statistics shows that individuals of other religions than Islam (at 27 per cent) are more likely to be a member of a religious organisation than Muslims.
More specifically, the share of persons who are registered members of a religious organisation is lower among the Alevi (10 per cent) and Shiites (10 per cent) than among the Sunnis (22 per cent). Among individuals of other Islamic denominations, such as the Ibadis or the Ahmadiyyas, as many as 29 per cent are members of an organisation (Haug et al. 2009, p. 160f). 14 per cent of Muslims report that they are actively involved in a religious organisation or community. There is no difference found between Muslims and persons identifying themselves with other religions (Haug et al. 2009, p. 162).

The study has revealed that the major Muslim associations which claim for themselves representative roles for Muslims in Germany receive little acknowledgement not only in this function, but also in the awareness of their existence altogether in the German 'umma'. The DiTiB, Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs, did best as it was mentioned by 44 per cent of all Muslims; 39 per cent of those who were aware of DiTiB recognized it as their representative, which accounts for less than 16 per cent of the German 'umma'. Moderate awareness was enjoyed by ZMD, Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland: Central Council of Muslims in Germany: 27 per cent of all Muslims know about its existence, and 2.7 per cent of all Muslims feel that ZMD represents them. Some 25 per cent of the imaginary 'umma' members are aware of the existence of VIKZ, Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren: Association of Islamic Culture Centres: 7.2 per cent of the 'umma' recognize VIKZ as their representative. About 27 per cent are aware of AABF, Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland: Alevi Community in Germany; 3.5 per cent consider AABF to be their representative. Poorly known is IR, Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany: only 16 per cent of all Muslims know about its existence and only 2.2 per cent feel that IR represents them. Some 10 per cent of Muslims have heard of KRM, Koordinationsrat der Muslime: Coordination Council of Muslims: 1.9 per cent feel to be represented by it. Across all regions of origin only very few of the Muslims living in Germany consider themselves to be represented by the associations. Only Muslims with the Turkish background are an exception here: 23 per cent of them, which is 28 per cent of Sunnis from Turkey, consider DiTiB to be their representative, some 10 per cent of Muslims from Turkey see VIKZ as their representative. Finally, 'only 13 per cent of Muslims interviewed are actively involved in a religious community' (Haug et al. 2009, p. 316).

Natalia Diefenbach observes that city politics on culture has so far managed to prevent denominational, political and ethnic conflicts from entering the life of 'umma islamiyya' in Frankfurt (Diefenbach-Popov 2008, p. 39). Statistics let us think that one of the reasons for that might be the fact, that most people who identify themselves as Muslims and are regarded by surveys and media as such are barely involved in the existing associations of the 'umma'. It is interesting therefore to look at the religiosity of people who identify themselves as Muslims.
Difference of religiosity: how devout is the 'umma islamiyya'

Statistics on Islam, as on any religion with established normative orders, can be done in different ways. If you take the self-identification as the marker at face value, you will count as Muslims people who call themselves Muslims. If you judge Islam by its own criteria in normative narratives, the picture will be very different. Take for example such internally important markers as prayer and religious festivals. Prayer is obligatory for Muslims, since it belongs to the five pillars of Islam (profession of faith, prayer, fasting, alms-giving, and pilgrimage), which constitute its minimal principles of common faith and religious behaviour according to moderate conservative Ulama as opposed to the activist political fundamentalist Islam, which sees Islam as a 'deen' covering the entire spectrum of human activity (Marty 1991, p. 824). Natalia Diefenbach introduced useful operational notions of Shahada-Muslims and Sharia-Muslims. These are two operational poles, which stand at both ends of the continuum of a real spectrum of Muslim religiosity. Minimal Muslims are Shahada-Muslims, whose self-identity grounds only in acknowledgement of the Shahada (i.e. the profession of faith in one God - Allah - and his prophet Muhammad) and who do not see themselves bound by other obligations. One could speak of them as cultural Muslims. At the opposite end of the scale are Sharia-Muslims, who consider following the Islamic law of Sharia to be a necessary condition for being Muslim. The reality is of course in the middle (Diefenbach-Popov 2007, p. 31 f).

Now, only a third of the total number of those who identify themselves as Muslims in Germany conduct daily prayer, while more than 20 per cent of all self-identified Muslims never pray, both much in concordance with data for other religions (Haug et al. 2009, p. 139).

The picture gets still more complex if we take into account denomination, region of origin and gender. Whereas 41.5 per cent of all Sunnis and 30.8 per cent of Shiites pray daily, only 14.2 per cent of Alevits do; and 30.3 per cent of Muslims of other denominations pray daily (Haug et al. 2009, p. 140). Interestingly, the most devout Muslims have their origins in Africa: 52 per cent of Muslims with a migrant background from North Africa and 53.3 per cent of Muslims from other parts of Africa pray daily, whereas only 34.5 per cent of all Muslims with origins in Turkey, 20.6 per cent of all self-identified Muslims with their origins in Iran and mere 11.9 per cent of Muslims with a migrant background from Southeast Europe pray every day (Haug et al. 2009, p. 141).

There is a clear gender disparity within these numbers: some 39 per cent of all female Muslims and some 29 per cent of all Muslim men pray daily. The male to female percentage ratios for Muslims who pray daily being for North Africa: 48.2 to 58.3 per cent, other parts of Africa: 54.5 to 66.7 per cent, Turkey: 28.2 to 40.8 per cent, Iran: 13.5 to 27.3 per cent, Southeast Europe 9.9 to 14.2 per cent (Haug et al. 2009, p. 142).

Some 19.5 per cent of all self-identified Muslims (14.1 per cent of Sunnis; 28.7 per cent of Shiites; 31.3 per cent of Alevits, 35.4 per cent of other
denominations) never celebrate major Muslim religious festivals and holidays, here in some disparity to the 29.5 per cent of self-identified adherents of other religions who never celebrate their religious festivals and holidays (Haug et al. 2009, p. 143f). And finally, just over half of the German 'umma islamiyya' observes fasting rules (Haug et al. 2009, p. 315).

A total of 36 per cent of the German 'umma' identify themselves as extremely devout persons. A significantly larger percentage of Muslims with migrant background from Turkey and North Africa - 88 per cent - describe themselves either as quite or extremely devout persons. Muslims from Southeast Europe and Iran have less pronounced devoutness. 30 per cent of Muslims with origins in Iran describe themselves as not devout at all (Haug et al. 2009, p. 134). Comparison between Muslims and people belonging to other religions indicates that strong self-ascribed devoutness is by no means specific to Muslims. For most regions of origin there is a similar correlation in the degree of religiousness between Muslims and members of other religions from the same region (Haug et al. 2009, p. 314).

Most Muslims are very well integrated in the German society, almost 70 per cent feel strong or very strong emotional attachment to Germany and 36 per cent of Muslims state that they are more emotionally attached to Germany than to their country of origin (Haug et al. 2009, p. 325).

The revealed facts could both be taken to be demonstrating the imaginary nature of the 'umma islamiyya' and providing useful insights in the real religiosity of individuals identifying themselves as Muslims.

Conclusion
In Frankfurt live about 80,000 individuals who call themselves Muslims, composing the imaginary urban 'umma islamiyya' and representing 'the Muslim life', posited by both Islam theology and scholarly research. More than a half of these persons are German citizens with a migrant background. Most of them come from Turkey. Others come from the Arab countries, notably Morocco, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Balkans and Iran. Very few come from Indonesia. Differing in many respects, they can be grouped according to their origins, languages, migration history, self-identified denomination and religiosity etc. Local Muslim associations in Frankfurt are organisations of compatriots reflecting origin, language and immigration history. Qualitative micro milieu research shows that local associations are run by families and friends. Statistical surveys show that most Muslims have never heard of the big umbrella associations of Muslims in Germany claiming to represent them. Muslims also do not feel to be represented by those associations. Most self-identified Muslims (87 per cent) are not actively involved in any existing Muslim association. In terms of religiosity much less than a half of Muslims consider themselves very devout and only one out of three prays daily. Three out of four Muslims feel strong or very strong attachment to Germany. However, the mentioned numbers vary significantly across origins, gender and denominations. Qualitative research records signs among some self-
identified Muslim persons of the second and third generations of migrants to position their Muslim identity over other identities. Some kind of authentic German Euro-Islam may be in the making (Diefenbach-Popov 2007, p. 99). The results should be taken with due caution, avoiding sweeping generalisations. The urban 'umma islamiyya' and its subsets of individuals combined by their origin, denomination, generation etc. remain abstract constructs just as other collectives like 'Christians' and 'Buddhists'.

References


